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Abstract
Bondarenko et al. have recently proposed an abstract framework for default reasoning. Besides
capturing most existing formalisms and proving that their standard semantics all coincide, the
framework extends these formalisms by generalising the semantics of admissible and preferred
arguments, originally proposed for logic programming only.
In this paper we analyse the computational complexity of credulous and sceptical reasoning
under the semantics of admissible and preferred arguments for (the propositional variant of) the
instances of the abstract framework capturing theorist, circumscription, logic programming, default
logic, and autoepistemic logic. Although the new semantics have been tacitly assumed to mitigate
the computational hardness of default reasoning under the standard semantics of stable extensions,
we show that in many cases reasoning under the admissibility and preferability semantics is
computationally harder than under the standard semantics. In particular, in the case of autoepistemic
logic, sceptical reasoning under preferred arguments is located at the fourth level of the polynomial
hierarchy, whereas the same form of reasoning under stable extensions is located at the second level.
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1. Introduction
Bondarenko et al. [1] show that many logics for default reasoning, i.e., theorist [25]
(many cases of) circumscription [20], Default Logic (DL) [26], Nonmonotonic Modal
Logic [21], Autoepistemic Logic (AEL) [22], and Logic Programming (LP) can be
understood as special cases of a single abstract framework. The standard semantics of
all these logics can be understood as sanctioning a set of assumptions as a stable extension
of a given theory, formulated in an underlying monotonic logic, iff the set of assumptions
does not attack itself and it attacks every assumption not in the set. In abstract terms, an
assumption can be attacked if its contrary can be proved, in the underlying monotonic
logic, possibly with the aid of other conflicting assumptions.
Bondarenko et al. also propose two new semantics generalising, respectively, the
admissibility semantics [8] and the semantics of preferred extensions [8] or partial stable
models [27] for LP. In abstract terms, a set of assumptions is an admissible argument of
a given theory, formulated in an underlying monotonic logic, iff it does not attack itself
and it attacks all sets of assumptions which attack it. A set of assumptions is a preferred
argument iff it is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) admissible argument.
The new semantics are more general than the stability semantics since every stable
extension is a preferred (and admissible) argument, but not every preferred argument
is a stable extension. Moreover, the new semantics are more liberal because for most
concrete logics for default reasoning, admissible and preferred arguments are always
guaranteed to exist, whereas stable extensions are not. Finally, reasoning under the
new semantics appears to be computationally easier than reasoning under the stability
semantics. Intuitively, to show that a given sentence is justified by a stable extension, it
is necessary to perform a global search amongst all the assumptions, to determine for each
such assumption whether it or its contrary can be derived, independently of the sentence
to be justified.1 For the semantics of admissible and preferred arguments, however, a
“local” search suffices. First, one has to construct a set of assumptions which, together
with the given theory, (monotonically) derives the sentence to be justified, and then one
has to augment the constructed set with further assumptions to defend it against all attacks
[6,7,18].
However, from a complexity-theoretic point of view, it seems unlikely that the new
semantics lead to better lower bounds than the standard semantics since all the “sources
of complexity” one has in default reasoning are still present. There are potentially
exponentially many assumption sets sanctioned by the semantics. Further, in order to
test whether a sentence is entailed by a particular argument, one has to reason in the
underlying monotonic logic. For this reason, one would expect that reasoning under the
new semantics has the same complexity as under the stability semantics, i.e., it is complete
for the first level of the polynomial hierarchy for LP and on the second level for logics
with full propositional logic as the underlying logic [3]. However, previous results on the
expressive power of DATALOG¬ queries by Saccà [28] suggest that this is not the case for
1 See [7,18] for a more general discussion of the problems associated with computing the stability semantics.
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LP. Indeed, Saccà’s results imply that reasoning under the preferability semantics for LP is
at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy.
In this paper we extend this analysis and provide complexity results for reasoning in
the propositional variants of theorist, circumscription, LP, DL, and AEL under the new
semantics. As it turns out, reasoning under the new semantics can be much harder than
reasoning under the standard semantics. In particular, we show that sceptical reasoning
in DL under the preferability semantics is on the third level of the polynomial hierarchy,
that credulous reasoning in AEL under the admissibility semantics is on the third level
of the polynomial hierarchy, and that sceptical reasoning in AEL under the preferability
semantics is on the fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy.
The paper2 is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises relevant features of the
abstract framework of [1], its semantics and concrete instances. Section 3 gives complexity
theory background and introduces the reasoning problems. Section 4 gives generic upper
bounds for credulous and sceptical reasoning, parametric with respect to the complexity
of the underlying monotonic logics. The generic results are instantiated to provide upper
bounds for concrete instances of the abstract framework. Section 5 gives then completeness
results for theorist and circumscription, Section 6 gives the completeness results for LP and
DL, and Section 7 gives the completeness results for AEL. Section 8 discusses the results
and concludes.
2. Default reasoning via argumentation
Assume a deductive system (L,R), where L is some formal language with countably
many sentences and R is a set of inference rules inducing a monotonic derivability notion
. Given a theory T ⊆ L and a formula α ∈ L, Th(T )= {α ∈ L | T  α} is the deductive
closure of T . Then, an abstract (assumption-based) framework is a triple 〈T ,A, 〉, where
T ,A⊆ L and is a mapping from A into L. T , the theory, is a set of beliefs, formulated
in the underlying language, and can be extended by subsets of A, the set of assumptions.
Indeed, an extension of an abstract framework 〈T ,A, 〉 is a theory Th(T ∪∆), with ∆⊆A
(sometimes an extension is referred to simply as T ∪∆ or ∆). Finally, given an assumption
α ∈A, α denotes the contrary of α.
Theorist can be understood as a framework 〈T ,A, 〉 where T and A are both arbitrary
sets of sentences of classical (first-order or propositional) logic and the contrary α of an
assumption α is just its negation.  is ordinary classical provability.
Many cases of circumscription3 can be understood similarly, except that the assump-
tions are negations of atomic sentences ¬p(t), for all predicates p which are minimised,
and atomic sentences q(t) or their negations, for all predicates q which are fixed.
LP is the instance of the abstract framework 〈T ,A, 〉 where T is a logic program, the
assumptions in A are all negations notp of atomic sentences p, and the contrary notp of
2 This paper combines earlier papers [4,5] by the same authors and it contains all formal proofs of the results
in full.
3 Namely, all cases where every model of the theory to be circumscribed is a Herbrand model of the theory,
see [1] for more details.
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an assumption is p.  is Horn logic provability, with assumptions, notp, understood as
new atoms p∗, as in [12].
DL is the instance of the abstract framework 〈T ,A, 〉 where the monotonic logic is
first-order logic augmented with domain-specific inference rules of the form
α1, . . . , αm,Mβ1, . . . ,Mβn
γ
where αi , βj , γ are sentences in classical logic. T is a classical theory and A consists of
all expressions of the form Mβ where β is a sentence of classical logic. The contrary Mβ
of an assumption Mβ is ¬β .
AEL has, as the underlying language L, a modal logic with a modal operator L, but the
inference rules are those of classical logic. The assumptions have the form ¬Lα or Lα.
The contrary of ¬Lα is α, and the contrary of Lα is ¬Lα.
Given an abstract framework 〈T ,A, 〉 and an assumption set ∆⊆A:
• ∆ attacks an assumption α ∈A iff α ∈ Th(T ∪∆);
• ∆ attacks an assumption set ∆′ ⊆A iff ∆ attacks some assumption α ∈∆′.
Given that an assumption set ∆⊆A is closed iff
∆=A∩ Th(T ∪∆),
the standard semantics of extensions of theorist [25], minimal models of circumscription
[20], extensions of DL [26], stable expansions of AEL [22], and stable models of LP
[14] correspond to the stability semantics of abstract frameworks, where an assumption
set ∆⊆A is stable iff
(1) ∆ is closed,
(2) ∆ does not attack itself, and
(3) ∆ attacks each assumption α /∈∆.
Assumption sets are always closed in the case of LP and DL. Frameworks with this
property are referred to as flat [1]. Assumption sets might not be closed in the case of
AEL. For example, given the theory T = {¬Lp} in AEL, the empty assumption set is
not closed. Furthermore, assumption sets might not be closed in the case of theorist and
circumscription. For example, if a formula is an assumption in theorist that is already
derived by the theory, then the empty assumption set is not closed.
A stable extension is an extension Th(T ∪∆) for some stable assumption set ∆. The
standard semantics of circumscription [20] corresponds to the intersection of all stable
extensions of the abstract framework corresponding to circumscription.
Bondarenko et al. argue that the stability semantics is unnecessarily restrictive, because
it insists that an assumption set should take a stand on every issue (assumption). Thus,
they define new semantics for the abstract framework, by generalising the argumentation-
theoretic reformulation of [17] for the semantics originally proposed for LP by Dung
[8]. The new semantics are defined in terms of “admissible” and “preferred” sets of
assumptions/extensions. An assumption set ∆⊆A is admissible iff
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(1) ∆ is closed,
(2) ∆ does not attack itself, and
(3) for all closed sets of assumptions ∆′ ⊆A, if ∆′ attacks ∆ then ∆ attacks ∆′.
Maximal (with respect to set inclusion) admissible assumption sets are called preferred.
In this paper we use the following terminology: an admissible (preferred) argument is an
extension Th(T ∪ ∆) for some admissible (preferred) assumption set ∆. Bondarenko et
al. show that preferred arguments correspond to preferred extensions [8] and partial stable
models [27] for LP.
Every stable assumption set/extension is preferred (and thus admissible) [1, Theorem
4.6], but not vice versa, in general. However, if the framework is normal, i.e., if every
maximal closed assumption set that does not attack itself is a stable set, then the
semantics of preferred and stable assumption sets coincide [1, Theorem 4.8]. Theorist
and circumscription are normal frameworks, which implies that stability and preferability
semantics are identical in these cases.
In the sequel we will use the following:
(Prop1) Every preferred assumption set is (trivially) admissible and every admissible
assumption set is a subset of some preferred assumption set.
(Prop2) The empty assumption set is always admissible, trivially, for all flat frameworks.
(Prop3) Every preferred extension is stable and every stable extension is preferred, for all
normal frameworks.
Moreover, for any given semantics amongst the stability, admissibility and preferability
semantics, we will use the terminology that “a set of assumptions is sanctioned by a
semantics” to mean that the set of assumptions is stable/admissible/preferred, respectively.
3. Reasoning problems and computational complexity
We will analyse the computational complexity of the following reasoning problems for
the propositional variants of the frameworks for theorist, circumscription, LP, DL, and AEL
under admissibility and preferability semantics:
• the credulous reasoning problem, i.e., the problem of deciding for any given sentence
ϕ ∈ L whether ϕ ∈ Th(T ∪∆) for some assumption set ∆ sanctioned by the semantics;
• the sceptical reasoning problem, i.e., the problem of deciding for any given sentence
ϕ ∈ L whether ϕ ∈ Th(T ∪∆) for all assumption sets ∆ sanctioned by the semantics.
Instead of the sceptical reasoning problem, we will often consider its complementary
problem, i.e.,
• the co-sceptical reasoning problem, i.e., the problem of deciding for any given
sentence ϕ whether ϕ /∈ Th(T ∪ ∆) for some assumption set ∆ sanctioned by the
semantics.
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Note that we are not advocating co-sceptical reasoning as interesting or useful epistemo-
logically. Rather, we use it to support our complexity analysis.
In addition, we will consider a sub-problem of all these problems, namely:
• the assumption set verification problem, i.e., the problem of deciding whether a given
set of assumptions ∆ is sanctioned by the semantics.
We briefly revise fundamental notions from complexity theory.4 We assume familiarity
with the complexity classes P, NP, and co-NP, and with the notions of many-one-
reductions, Turing reductions, and hardness and completeness with respect to these
reductions.
The complexity of the above problems for all frameworks and semantics we consider
is located at the lower end of the polynomial hierarchy. This is a (presumably) infinite
hierarchy of complexity classes above NP defined by using oracle machines, i.e., Turing
machines that are allowed to call a subroutine—the oracle—deciding some fixed problem
in constant time. Let C be a class of decision problems. Then, PC denotes the class of
problems that can be solved on a deterministic oracle machine in polynomial time with an
oracle that decides a problem in C . In general, for any class X defined by resource bounds,
X C denotes the class of problems decidable on a Turing machine with a resource bound
given by X and an oracle for a problem in C .5 Based on these notions, the sets ∆pk , pk ,
and pk are defined as follows:6

p
0 =p0 =∆p0 = P,

p
k+1 = NP
p
k ,

p
k+1 = co-NP
p
k ,
∆
p
k+1 = P
p
k .
The “canonical” complete problems are SAT for p1 = NP and k-QBF for pk (k > 1),
where k-QBF is the problem of deciding whether the quantified boolean formula
∃ p ∀q . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸Φ( p, q, . . .).
k alternating quantifiers starting with ∃
is true, for a formula Φ . The above problems remain complete for their respective classes
when the innermost quantifier is ∃ and the formula Φ is in 3CNF, as well as when the
innermost quantifier is ∀ and the formula Φ is in 3DNF [30]. The complementary of a
k-QBF problem, denoted by co-k-QBF, is complete for pk .
4 Good textbooks covering the notions we introduce here have been written by Garey and Johnson [13] and
Papadimitriou [24].
5 Note that because using an oracle for a problem from C is identical to using an oracle for a problem from
co-C, we have XC =X co-C . For this reason, one usually does not use the notation X co-C .
6 The super-script p is only used to distinguish these classes from the analogous classes in the Kleene
hierarchy.
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Table 1
Existing computational complexity results for the stability semantics
Credulous Sceptical
reasoning reasoning
Logic programming NP-complete co-NP-complete
Theorist p2 -complete 
p
2 -complete
Circumscription p2 -complete 
p
2 -complete
Default logic p2 -complete 
p
2 -complete
Autoepistemic logic p2 -complete 
p
2 -complete
All problems in the polynomial hierarchy can be solved in polynomial time iff P= NP.
Further, all these problems can be solved by worst-case exponential time algorithms. Thus,
the polynomial hierarchy might not seem too meaningful. However, different levels of the
polynomial hierarchy differ considerably in practice, e.g., methods working for moderately
sized instances of NP-complete problems do not work for p2 -complete problems.
The complexity of the problems we are interested in has been extensively studied for
existing logics for default reasoning under the standard, stability semantics [2,3,10,15,
19,23,29]. Table 1 gives a partial summary of these results for the different logics. We
note here that the semantics of circumscription has been originally proposed with respect
to sceptical reasoning only. In this case, as shown in [1], reasoning in circumscription
(restricted to Herbrand models) coincides with sceptical reasoning in theorist under the
stability semantics. Moreover, we can naturally extend circumscription and define its
credulous reasoning via a one-to-one correspondence with credulous reasoning in theorist
under the stability semantics (see [1] for more details). Hence the complexity result for
credulous reasoning in circumscription is a direct consequence of the respective result for
theorist. The complexity results for reasoning in circumscription under the admissibility
semantics, presented later in the paper, can be understood in a similar way.
4. Generic upper bounds
In this section we give a number of generic upper bounds for reasoning under the
admissibility and preferability semantics that are parametric on the complexity of the
derivability problem in the underlying monotonic logic. This allows us to derive upper
bounds for a wide range of concrete logics for default reasoning.
In the case of LP, the underlying logic is propositional Horn logic, hence the derivability
problem is P-complete (under log-space reductions) [24, p. 176]. In the case of theorist,
circumscription and AEL, the underlying logic is classical propositional logic, hence
the derivability problem is co-NP-complete. Finally, in the case of DL, the underlying
monotonic derivability is classical derivability extended with domain-specific inference
rules. However, these extra inference rules do not increase the complexity of reasoning.
Indeed, it is known (e.g., see [16, p. 90]) that for any DL-like propositional monotonic rule
system S, checking whether S  ϕ is NP-complete. Therefore, the following proposition
follows immediately.
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Proposition 1. Given a DL framework 〈T ,A, 〉, deciding for a sentence ϕ ∈ L and an
assumption set ∆⊆A whether ϕ ∈ Th(T ∪∆) is co-NP-complete.
In order to decide the credulous and co-sceptical reasoning problems, one can apply the
following non-deterministic algorithm:
Algorithm 2.
(1) Guess an assumption set,
(2) verify that it is sanctioned by the semantics, and
(3) verify that the formula under consideration is derivable from the set of assumptions
and the monotonic theory or not derivable from it, respectively.
From this it follows that credulous reasoning and co-sceptical reasoning is in the
complexity class NPC , provided reasoning in the underlying logic is in C and the
verification that an assumption set is sanctioned by the semantics can be done with
polynomially many calls to a C-oracle. For the stability semantics, we need indeed only
polynomially many C-oracle calls in order to verify that the assumption set ∆ is not
self-attacking and that it is closed and attacks all assumptions α /∈ ∆. However, for the
admissibility and preferability semantics the verification step does not seem to be so easy,
as suggested by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For frameworks with an underlying monotonic logic with a derivability
problem in C , the assumption set verification problem is
• in PC under the stability semantics,
• in co-NPC under the admissibility semantics, and
• in co-NPNPC under the preferability semantics.
Proof. The first claim follows from the argument above that polynomially many C-oracle
calls are sufficient to verify that an assumption set is stable.
In order to prove the second claim, we give the following nondeterministic, polynomial-
time algorithm that uses a C-oracle and decides whether ∆⊆A is not admissible:
(1) Check whether ∆ is closed. If not, succeed, otherwise continue.
(2) Guess an assumption set ∆′ ⊆A.
(3) Verify that ∆′ is closed, using |A−∆′| C-oracle calls.
(4) Verify that ∆′ attacks ∆, using |∆| C-oracle calls.
(5) Verify that ∆ does not attack ∆′, using |∆′| C-oracle calls.
Obviously, this algorithm succeeds iff ∆ is not admissible, i.e., it decides the complement
of the assumption set verification problem, thus proving the claim.
In order to prove the third claim, for any assumption set ∆⊆ A that we want to verify,
we give the following nondeterministic, polynomial-time algorithm that uses an NPC -
oracle:
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(1) Check whether ∆ is admissible, using one NPC-oracle call (by the second claim). If it
is not, succeed. Otherwise continue.
(2) Guess an assumption set ∆′ ⊃∆.
(3) Check whether ∆′ is admissible, using one NPC -oracle call (by the second claim). If it
is, succeed. Otherwise fail.
Obviously, this algorithm succeeds iff ∆ is not preferred. This means it decides the
complement of the assumption set verification problem, thus proving the claim. ✷
Furthermore, in the general case, there does not appear to be more efficient algorithms
for the assumption set verification problems than the ones given in Theorem 3. For the
special flat and normal frameworks, however, more efficient algorithms can be found, as
demonstrated by the following two theorems.
Theorem 4. For flat frameworks with an underlying monotonic logic with a derivability
problem in C , the assumption set verification problem is
• in PC under the admissibility semantics, and
• in co-NPC under the preferability semantics.
Proof. We prove the first claim by giving the following deterministic, polynomial-time
algorithm using a C-oracle, for any assumption set ∆⊆A that we want to verify:
(1) Check whether ∆ attacks itself, using polynomially many C-oracle calls. If it does,
succeed. Otherwise continue.
(2) Compute
A∗ = {α ∈A−∆ |∆ does not attack α},
using |A−∆| calls to a C-oracle.
(3) Check whether A∗ ∪∆ attacks ∆, using polynomially many C-oracle calls. If it does,
succeed. Otherwise fail.
It is easy to see that if this algorithm succeeds then ∆ is not admissible, as A∗ ∪∆ attacks
∆ but, by (2), ∆ does not attack A∗ and, by (1), ∆ does not attack itself.7 Moreover, if the
algorithm fails then∆ is admissible. Indeed, let ∆′ be any attack against∆. If ∆′ ⊆A∗∪∆,
then, by monotonicity of the underlying logic, A∗ ∪∆ attacks ∆, thus contradicting that
the algorithm fails. Therefore, ∆′ ⊆ A∗ ∪∆. Let α ∈ ∆′ − A∗ −∆. By (2), ∆ attacks α.
Thus, ∆ attacks ∆′, and, by (1), ∆ is admissible.
The second claim of the theorem follows by reconsidering the algorithm used in the
proof of Theorem 3 for the third claim, but using PC -oracle calls at steps (1) and (3). ✷
7 Note that if the framework is not flat, then the assumption set A∗ ∪∆ might not be closed. Therefore, even
if (3) succeeds, ∆ can still be admissible, as it may attack an assumption that is derivable from A∗ ∪∆.
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Due to (Prop3), for normal frameworks the assumption set verification task under the
preferability semantics is easier, as it can be reduced to that under the stability semantics.
Therefore, the following result is a direct corollary of Theorem 3.
Proposition 5. For normal frameworks with an underlying monotonic logic with a
derivability problem in C , the assumption set verification problem under the preferability
semantics is in PC .
We could now apply directly Algorithm 2 described above in combination with the
above results for deriving upper bounds for the credulous and sceptical reasoning problems.
However, some of the upper bounds thus obtained can be reduced, as follows.
Directly from (Prop1), we have the following result.
Proposition 6. Credulous reasoning under the admissibility semantics is equivalent to
credulous reasoning under the preferability semantics.
Thus, it follows directly that credulous reasoning under the admissibility semantics
has the same upper bound as credulous reasoning under the preferability semantics. In
particular, for normal frameworks we get the same upper bound for credulous reasoning
under the admissibility semantics as for the stability semantics.
In addition, co-sceptical and sceptical reasoning under the admissibility semantics is
often much simpler than suggested by the upper bounds of the respective assumption
set verification problem combined with Algorithm 2. For example, in flat frameworks
〈T ,A, 〉 the sceptical reasoning problem reduces to the classical derivability from the
theory T , because of (Prop2). This might be the case even for non-flat frameworks. We call
an assumption-based framework 〈T ,A, 〉 simple iff there is no admissible assumption set
whenever T is inconsistent in the underlying monotonic logic,8 and otherwise there exists
a minimal (with respect to set inclusion) admissible set ∆m =A∩ Th(T ).
Proposition 7. For flat frameworks and for simple frameworks with an underlying
monotonic logic with a derivability problem in C , the sceptical reasoning problem under
the admissibility semantics is in C .
All the results in this section combined with Algorithm 2 give the next theorem,
specifying upper bounds for the reasoning problems for all the types of frameworks
considered so far.
Theorem 8. Upper bounds for the different reasoning problems, types of frameworks, and
semantics are as specified in the following table:
8 Note that not all deductive systems underlying an abstract framework are equipped with a notion of
inconsistency. For example, the instance of the framework for LP is not. Moreover, note that the notion of
inconsistency is a separate notion from that of contrary.
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Frameworks Stability Admissibility Preferability
cred. scept. cred. scept. cred. scept.
general NPC co-NPC NPNPC co-NPNPC NPNPC co-NPNPNP
C
normal NPC co-NPC NPC co-NPNPC NPC co-NPC
flat NPC co-NPC NPC C NPC co-NPNPC
simple NPC co-NPC NPNPC C NPNPC co-NPNPNP
C
Proof. The results for the stability semantics follow from applying Algorithm 2, with step
(2) of the algorithm solvable by a call to a PC oracle (by Theorem 3), and step (3) solvable
by a call to a C-oracle. This gives an upper bound of NPPC , which coincides with NPC , for
both the credulous and co-sceptical reasoning problems.
The results for the admissibility semantics in the first row and for sceptical reasoning
under the preferability semantics in the first row follow by the same argument.
The result for credulous reasoning under the preferability semantics in the first row
follows from Proposition 6 and the corresponding result for the admissibility semantics.
The results for admissibility and preferability semantics in the second row are justified
as follows. Credulous reasoning under admissibility and preferability semantics as well
as co-sceptical reasoning under the preferability semantics can be shown to be in NPPC ,
which equals NPC , by using Algorithm 2 and applying Propositions 6 and 5. Further, the
upper bound for sceptical reasoning under the admissibility semantics is the general upper
bound given in the first row.
The results for admissibility and preferability semantics in the third row follow by
applying Proposition 7 for sceptical reasoning under admissibility and, for the other
columns, Algorithm 2 and Theorem 4.
Finally, the results for admissibility and preferability semantics in the fourth row are
the general results in the first row, with the exception of the result for sceptical reasoning
under the admissibility semantics given by Proposition 7. ✷
As shown in the table, the upper bounds derived for sceptical reasoning under the
admissibility semantics are sometimes lower than those derived for sceptical reasoning
under the stability semantics. However, in these cases it amounts to deriving monotonic
conclusions from the theory T and ignoring the assumptions completely. In other words,
in these cases, default reasoning is trivialised.
5. Simple, normal frameworks: Theorist and circumscription
The concrete frameworks for theorist and circumscription are normal [1] and simple, as
shown below.
Lemma 9. The frameworks for theorist and circumscription are simple.
Proof. Circumscription is a special instance of theorist. Thus, we only need to prove the
theorem for theorist.
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If the given theorist theory T is inconsistent then the corresponding framework admits
no admissible argument, as any closed assumption set attacks itself.
Assume that T is consistent. Then, we only need to prove that ∆= Th(T ) ∩A attacks
every closed assumption set ∆′ which attacks ∆. Now, if ∆ = ∅, then there is no set ∆′
that attacks ∆. If ∆ = ∅, then ∆′ attacks ∆ iff T ∪∆′ is inconsistent and, as ∆′ is closed,
∆′ =A. Thus, necessarily ∆ attacks ∆′. ✷
For both frameworks, the credulous and sceptical reasoning problems reach the
respective upper bounds specified in Theorem 8. Indeed, due to Proposition 6 and
(Prop3), credulous reasoning under admissibility and preferability semantics is identical
to credulous reasoning under the standard, stability semantics, leading to the result that
the complexity is also identical. Thus, the next proposition follows immediately from the
results in Table 1.
Proposition 10. Credulous reasoning in theorist and circumscription under the admissi-
bility and preferability semantics is p2 -complete.
Directly by (Prop3), sceptical reasoning under the preferability semantics is identical
to sceptical reasoning under the stability semantics. Thus, the next proposition follows
immediately from the results in Table 1.
Proposition 11. Sceptical reasoning in theorist and circumscription under the preferability
semantics is p2 -complete.
Finally, sceptical reasoning under the admissibility semantics is trivial because the
frameworks are simple and sceptical reasoning reduces to monotonic derivability from
the theory.
Proposition 12. Sceptical reasoning in theorist and circumscription frameworks under the
admissibility semantics is co-NP-complete.
In other words, for the concrete frameworks for theorist and circumscription, we either
get the same results as under the stability semantics or we get trivial results.
6. Flat frameworks: Logic programming and default reasoning
As in the case of theorist and circumscription, in the case of LP and DL the upper
bounds specified in Theorem 8 are tight.
Since the concrete framework for LP is flat, sceptical reasoning under the admissibility
semantics reduces to reasoning in the underlying monotonic logic, i.e., derivability in
propositional Horn theories, which is P-complete.
Proposition 13. Sceptical reasoning in LP under the admissibility semantics is P-complete.
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From Theorem 8, again because the LP framework is flat, credulous reasoning under
the admissibility and preferability semantics is in NPP, which equals NP. NP-completeness
can be obtained as a direct corollary of an earlier result by Saccà [28], that the expressive
power of DATALOG¬ queries under the “possible M-stable semantics” (corresponding to
credulous reasoning under the admissibility and preferability semantics) coincides with
DB-NP, i.e., the class of all databases that are recognisable in NP. From this result the
following theorem follows immediately.
Theorem 14. Credulous reasoning in LP under the admissibility and preferability
semantics is NP-complete.
Again from Theorem 8, sceptical reasoning in LP under the preferability semantics
is in co-NPNPP , which coincides with p2 . 
p
2 -completeness can be obtained again as a
direct corollary of the result proven again by Saccà [28], that the expressive power of
DATALOG¬ queries under the “definite M-stable semantics” (corresponding to sceptical
preferability semantics) coincides with the class DB-p2 , i.e., the class of all databases that
are recognisable in DB-p2 . From this result the following theorem follows immediately.
Theorem 15. Sceptical reasoning in LP under the preferability semantics is p2 -complete.
Therefore, for LP, credulous reasoning under admissibility and preferability semantics
has the same complexity as under the stability semantics (see Table 1), whereas sceptical
reasoning is either one level lower but trivial, under the admissibility semantics, or one
level higher, under the preferability semantics, than under the stability semantics.
Since the instance of the framework for DL is flat, sceptical reasoning under the
admissibility semantics reduces to reasoning in the underlying monotonic logic, i.e.,
derivability in propositional classical logic, which is co-NP-complete.
Proposition 16. Sceptical reasoning in DL under the admissibility semantics is co-NP-
complete.
By Proposition 6, credulous reasoning under the preferability semantics coincides
with credulous reasoning under the admissibility semantics. From Theorem 8, credulous
reasoning under the admissibility and preferability semantics is in NPNP, which coincides
with p2 . 
p
2 -hardness, and therefore
p
2 -completeness, can be proven by a reduction from
2-QBF.
Theorem 17. Credulous reasoning in DL under the admissibility and preferability
semantics is p2 -complete.
Proof. By Proposition 6, it suffices to prove the theorem for the admissibility semantics.
Membership follows from Theorem 8. To prove hardness, we use a straightforward
reduction from 2-QBF to the credulous reasoning problem under the admissibility
semantics.
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Assume the quantified boolean formula ∃p1, . . . , pn ∀q1, . . . , qmΦ , with Φ a formula
in 3DNF over the propositional variables p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm. We construct a DL theory
(∅,D) such that the given quantified boolean formula is true iff some admissible argument
for the framework corresponding to (∅,D) contains Φ .
Let D consists of the default rules
Mpi
pi
; M¬pi¬pi
for each i = 1, . . . , n, simulating the choice of a truth value for each propositional variable
pi in Φ . Obviously, (∅,D) can be constructed in log-space. Moreover, it is easy to see
that the given 2-QBF is true iff there exists an admissible extension of the framework
corresponding to (∅,D) containing Φ . ✷
Again from Theorem 8, in DL, sceptical reasoning under the preferability semantics is
in co-NPNPNP , which coincides with p3 . 
p
3 -hardness, and therefore 
p
3 -completeness,
can be proven by a reduction from 3-QBF.
Theorem 18. Sceptical reasoning in DL under the preferability semantics is p3 -complete.
Proof. Membership follows from Theorem 8. To prove hardness, we use a reduction from
3-QBF to the co-sceptical reasoning problem under the preferability semantics.
Assume the quantified boolean formula Ψ = ∃p1, . . . , pn ∀q1, . . . , qm ∃r1, . . . , rkΦ,
with Φ a formula in 3CNF over the propositional variables p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm,
r1, . . . , rk . We construct a DL theory (∅,D) such that Ψ is true iff some sentence F is
not contained in some preferred argument for the framework corresponding to (∅,D).
The language of (∅,D) contains atoms p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm, and r1, . . . , rk as well
as atoms t1, . . . , tn, s1, . . . , sm, intuitively holding true iff a truth value for the variables
p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm, respectively, has been chosen. D consists of the default rules
M(pi ∧ ti)
pi ∧ ti ;
M(¬pi ∧ ti)
¬pi ∧ ti ;
M(qj ∧ sj )
qj ∧ sj ;
M(¬qj ∧ sj )
¬qj ∧ sj
for each i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, simulating the choice of a truth value for each pi and
qj in Φ ,
MΦ∧
j=1,...,m¬sj
to prohibit choices of truth values for all the qj ’s that render Φ satisfiable,
M¬sj∧
h=1,...,m¬sh
; M¬ti∧
h=1,...,n¬th ∧
∧
h=1,...,m¬sh
for each i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, to enforce that truth value choices are made either for
all qj ’s or for no qj and that truth value choices are made either for all pi ’s or for none of
the pi ’s and qj ’s, and finally
MΦ
¬Φ ;
M¬ti
ti
; M¬sj
sj
,
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for each i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m to guarantee that no admissible assumption set contains
MΦ or any of M¬ti and M¬sj .
Obviously, (∅,D) can be constructed in log-space. Moreover, we prove that Ψ is true iff
there is a preferred argument not containing F =∧j=1,...,m sj . In other words, the 3-QBF
Ψ can be reduced to co-sceptical reasoning in DL under the preferability semantics.
In the sequel we will use the following terminology. If v is a truth assignment to the
pi ’s, we denote by ∆pv the assumption set
{
M(pi ∧ ti ) | v(pi)= true, i = 1, . . . , n
}
∪{M(¬pi ∧ ti ) | v(pi)= false, i = 1, . . . , n
}
.
Similarly, if u is a truth assignment to the qj ’s, we denote by ∆qu the assumption set
{
M(qj ∧ sj ) | v(qj )= true, j = 1, . . . ,m
}
∪{M(¬qj ∧ sj ) | v(qj )= false, j = 1, . . . ,m
}
.
First of all, it is obvious that no admissible assumption set can contain any of the
assumptions MΦ , M¬si , M¬ti (as, if it did, it would attack itself). Furthermore, it is
easy to see that for any truth assignment v to the pi ’s, the set ∆pv is an admissible set.
Moreover, every preferred assumption set must contain a set ∆pv for some truth assignment
v to the pi ’s. Finally, if ∆pv is not preferred, then there exists a truth assignment u to the
qi ’s such that ∆pv ∪∆qu is preferred.
Assume that Ψ is true under a particular truth assignment v to the pi ’s. Obviously, ∆pv
does not derive F =∧j=1,...,m sj . We show that the set ∆pv is a preferred assumption set.
Suppose that it is not, and that we can extend ∆pv by the set ∆qu, for some truth
assignment u to the qi’s, thus obtaining an admissible set. Then, ∆pv ∪∆qu counter attacks
the attack {MΦ}, i.e., ¬Φ belongs to the extension given by ∆pv ∪∆qu. As a consequence,
Ψ is not true under the truth assignment v: contradiction.
Conversely, assume that the framework corresponding to (∅,D) admits a preferred
argument ∆ that does not derive F =∧j=1,...,m sj . We prove that Ψ is true.
Clearly there exists some truth assignment v to the pi ’s such that ∆pv ⊆∆. Since ∆ is
preferred and it does not contain F , none of the sets ∆pv ∪ ∆qu, for every possible truth
assignment u to the qi ’s, is admissible. This means that none of these sets of assumptions
can counter attack the attack {MΦ} and derive ¬Φ . Therefore, Ψ is true. ✷
Therefore, as in the LP case, in the DL case credulous reasoning under the admissibility
and preferability semantics has the same complexity as under the stability semantics
(see Table 1), whereas sceptical reasoning is either one level lower but trivial, under the
admissibility semantics, or one level higher, under the preferability semantics, than under
the stability semantics.
Note that similar results to the one obtained above for DL have been recently obtained
for disjunctive logic programming [11].
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7. General frameworks: Autoepistemic logic
AEL is neither flat, simple, nor normal. This means that we cannot expect any
simplifications when reasoning in AEL frameworks. As a matter of fact, the upper bounds
for general frameworks, which apply of course, are also tight for AEL.
By Proposition 6, credulous reasoning under the preferability semantics coincides
with credulous reasoning under the admissibility semantics. From Theorem 8, since the
reasoning problem in the underlying monotonic logic for AEL is classical reasoning
in propositional logic (coNP-complete), credulous reasoning under the admissibility and
preferability semantics is in NPNPNP , which coincides with p3 . 
p
3 -hardness, and therefore

p
3 -completeness, can be proven by a reduction from 3-QBF.
Theorem 19. Credulous reasoning in AEL under the admissibility and preferability
semantics is p3 -complete.
Proof. By Proposition 6, it suffices to prove the theorem for the admissibility semantics.
Membership follows from Theorem 8. To prove hardness, we use a reduction from 3-QBF
to the credulous reasoning problem under the admissibility semantics.
Assume the following quantified boolean formula Ψ = ∃p1, . . . , pn ∀q1, . . . , qm
∃r1, . . . , rkΦ, with Φ a formula in 3CNF over the propositional variables p1, . . . , pn,
q1, . . . , qm, r1, . . . , rk . We construct an AEL theory T such that Ψ is true iff some sentence
F is contained in some admissible argument for the framework corresponding to T .
The language of T contains atoms p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm, and r1, . . . , rk as well as
atoms t1, . . . , tn, intuitively holding if a truth value for the variables p1, . . . , pn has been
chosen, and an atom s used to prevent that any truth value for the qj ’s can be chosen. T
consists of the sentences:
¬L¬pi → pi ∧ ti ,
¬Lpi →¬pi ∧ ti ,
¬L¬Φ
¬L¬qj → qj ∧ s ∧¬Ls,
¬Lqj →¬qj ∧ s ∧¬Ls,
for each i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m.
Obviously, T can be constructed in log-space. Now we prove that the framework
corresponding to T admits an admissible extension containing F =∧i=1,...,n ti iff Ψ is
true. This means that the given 3-QBF can be reduced to credulous reasoning under the
admissibility semantics.
Assume that the framework corresponding to T admits an admissible extension ∆
deriving F . Then, for each i = 1, . . . , n, either ¬L¬pi or ¬Lpi is part of ∆, for F to be
derived by it. Further, ¬L¬Φ must be part of ∆, for ∆ to be closed, and thus admissible.
Finally, none of the assumptions¬L¬qi ,¬Lqi can be part of∆, for otherwise∆, if closed,
would attack itself and thus be non-admissible.
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Consider any assumption set A that attacks ∆. A must attack one of the assumptions
¬L¬pi , ¬Lpi , or ¬L¬Φ . However, if A attacked any of ¬L¬pi , ¬Lpi , then ∆ would
immediately counter-attack A. Therefore, for A to be an assumption set that can possibly
render ∆ non-admissible, it must make the same choices on the pi ’s as ∆, and attack
¬L¬Φ . For A to attack ¬L¬Φ , then A must derive ¬Φ , by including, in addition to the
assumptions from {¬L¬pi,¬Lpi}i=1,...,n already chosen by ∆, assumptions from the set
{¬L¬qj ,¬Lqj }j=1,...,m. Such choices cannot be counter-attacked by ∆ without making it
self-attacking. Therefore, since ∆ is admissible, no such A exists. This means that, for the
given choices on the pi ’s in ∆, no choices for the qj ’s exist that make ¬Φ true. In other
words, for the given choice of the pi in ∆, and for all choices of the truth values for the
qj ’s, there exists an assignment of truth values to the rl ’s that makes Φ true, which implies
that Ψ is necessarily true.
Conversely, assume that there is no admissible extension of the framework correspond-
ing to T deriving F above. Then, regardless of the choices for the pi ’s, there is always an
attack on ¬L¬Φ , deriving ¬Φ , that cannot be counter-attacked while keeping the candi-
date set of assumptions non-self-attacking. Then, by the arguments presented above, the
given 3-QBF formula Ψ cannot be true. ✷
Again from Theorem 8, sceptical reasoning under the admissibility and preferability
semantics in AEL is in co-NPNPNP , which coincides with p3 . 
p
3 -hardness, and therefore

p
3 -completeness, can be proven by a reduction from 3-QBF.
Theorem 20. Sceptical reasoning in AEL under the admissibility semantics is p3 -
complete.
Proof. Membership follows from Theorem 8. To prove hardness, we use a reduction from
3-QBF to the co-sceptical reasoning problem under the admissibility semantics.
We use the reduction in the proof of the previous Theorem 19, but extend the theory T
constructed there to the theory T ′ = T ∪ {L∧i ti}.
Any admissible set ∆ must contain the assumptions ¬L¬Φ and L∧i ti in order for
∆ to be closed. Furthermore, any admissible extension of T ′ must contain
∧
i ti because
otherwise it is attacked by ¬L∧i ti without having a counter-attack. From this fact and
the above observations it follows that T ′ has an admissible extension iff the given 3-QBF
formula Ψ is true. Given that if no admissible extension exists all co-sceptical queries will
be answered negatively, the above is equivalent to the fact that ¬∧i ti is not a sceptical
consequence of T ′ iff Ψ is true, i.e., the construction is a log-space reduction from 3-QBF
to co-sceptical reasoning under the admissibility semantics. ✷
Again from Theorem 8, in AEL, sceptical reasoning under the preferability semantics is
in co-NPNPNP
NP
, which coincides with p4 . 
p
4 -hardness, and therefore 
p
4 -completeness,
can be proven by a reduction from 4-QBF.
Theorem 21. Sceptical reasoning in AEL under the preferability semantics is p4 -
complete.
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Proof. Membership follows from Theorem 8. To prove hardness, we use a reduction from
4-QBF to the co-sceptical reasoning problem under the preferability semantics.
Assume the following quantified boolean formula Ψ = ∃p1, . . . , pn ∀q1, . . . , qm
∃r1, . . . , rk ∀s1, . . . , so Φ, with Φ a formula in 3DNF over the propositional variables
p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm, r1, . . . , rk , and s1, . . . , so . We construct an AEL theory T such that
Ψ is true iff a particular sentence F is not contained in some preferred argument of T .
The language of T contains atoms p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm, and r1, . . . , rk , s1, . . . , so as
well as atoms t1, . . . , tm, the latter intuitively holding iff a truth value for the variables
q1, . . . , qm has been chosen. Finally, we have atoms v and w. The atom v is used to block
the truth assignment to the qj ’s and w is used to prohibit any choices on assumptions
{¬L¬rh,¬Lrh} in the preferred argument.
T consists of the following sentences:
¬L¬pi → pi, (1)
¬Lpi →¬pi, (2)
¬L¬qj ∧¬Lv→ qj ∧ tj , (3)
¬Lqj ∧¬Lv→¬qj ∧ tj , (4)
¬Ltj → v, (5)
¬L¬rh → rh ∧w ∧¬Lw, (6)
¬Lrh →¬rh ∧w ∧¬Lw, (7)
Φ→ v, (8)
for each i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, h= 1, . . . , k.
Now we claim that there exists a preferred extension not containing F =∧ ti iff Ψ is
true.
First, one notes that an assumption set containing non-conflicting assumptions from the
set {¬L¬pi,¬Lpi} is an admissible set. Let ∆ be a maximal such set.
Secondly, it is obvious that ∆ can be expanded (in a non-trivial way) only by adding the
assumption ¬Lv and assumptions from the set {¬L¬qj ,¬Lqj }. Let us call this expanded
set ∆′. Such a set ∆′ is only admissible if we make choices for all qj ’s because otherwise
∆′ can be attacked by ¬Ltj (using ¬Ltj → v) for which there is no counter-attack from
∆′.
Thirdly, the set ∆′ cannot be further expanded using assumptions from {¬L¬rh,¬Lrh},
because these assumptions lead to an immediate self-attack.
Fourthly, an assumption set ∆′ containing assumptions from {¬L¬qj ,¬Lqj } together
with ¬Lv can only be admissible if ¬Lv cannot be attacked by any assumption set.
The only way to construct an attack A against ¬Lv in ∆′, which is not immediately
counter-attacked by ∆′, would be to use all assumptions in ∆′ and assumptions from
{¬L¬rh,¬Lrh}. Note that such assumptions cannot be counter-attacked by ∆′. Now the
only way to attack ¬Lv would be to make v true, and in order to do so, one has to make Φ
true.
Assuming now that∆′ is admissible means that for all possible choices for the rh’s, Φ is
not derivable, i.e., there is always a truth assignment to the sk’s that makes ¬Φ true. This
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means that ∆ cannot be expanded by assumptions from {¬L¬qj ,¬Lqj } together with
¬Lv, if under the truth assignment to the pi ’s corresponding to the assumptions in ∆, for
all truth assignments to the qj ’s, there is always an truth assignment to the rh’s that makes
Φ true. In other words, if there exists a preferred assumption set that does not render
∧
tj
true under T , Ψ is true.
Conversely, let us assume that Ψ is true. Let ∆ be an assumption set containing
assumptions from {¬L¬pi,¬Lpi} corresponding to a truth assignment to the pi ’s that
makes ∀q1, . . . , qm∃r1, . . . , rk∀s1, . . . , soΦ true. This assumption set cannot be expanded
to ∆′ by assumptions from {¬L¬qj ,¬Lqj } together with ¬Lv, because for any such
expansion there exists a value assignment to the rh’s which makes Φ true, corresponding
to a set of choices from {¬L¬rh,¬Lrh} which together with ∆′ is an assumptions set
that leads together with T to the derivation of Φ and v, hence attacking ∆′. For this
reason, there exists a preferred extension not containing both ¬Lv and choices from
{¬L¬qj ,¬Lqj }, and hence this preferred extension does not contain ∧ tj . ✷
Therefore, all reasoning problems are harder in AEL under the admissibility and
preferability semantics than under the stability semantics (see Table 2). Indeed, credulous
reasoning under admissibility and preferability semantics is one level higher than under the
stability semantics (Theorem 19); sceptical reasoning under the admissibility semantics
is one level higher than under the stability semantics (Theorem 20); sceptical reasoning
under the preferability semantics is two levels higher than under the stability semantics
(Theorem 21).
Moreover, whereas reasoning under the stability semantics has the same complexity in
AEL as in DL, reasoning under the admissibility and preferability semantics is harder
in AEL than in DL. Indeed, sceptical reasoning under the preferability semantics and
credulous reasoning under the admissibility and preferability semantics are one level harder
for AEL than for DL, and sceptical reasoning under the admissibility semantics is two
levels harder.
We note that various complexity results for the parsimonious and moderately grounded
semantics for AEL are presented in [9]. It would be interesting to see how the semantics
for AEL provided by preferred/admissible arguments (for the instance of the abstract
framework for AEL) relate to the semantics of [9]. This is however outside the scope of
the present paper.
Table 2
Overview of complexity results
Framework Property Admissibility Preferability Stability
cred. scept. cred. scept. cred. scept.
AEL general p3 -c. 
p
3 -c. 
p
3 -c. 
p
4 -c. 
p
2 -c. 
p
2 -c.
DL
flat

p
2 -c. co-NP-c. 
p
2 -c. 
p
3 -c. 
p
2 -c. 
p
2 -c.
LP NP-c. P-c. NP-c. p2 -c. NP-c. co-NP-c.
Theorist simple & p2 -c. co-NP-c. 
p
2 -c. 
p
2 -c. 
p
2 -c. 
p
2 -c.
Circumscription normal p2 -c. co-NP-c. 
p
2 -c. 
p
2 -c. 
p
2 -c. 
p
2 -c.
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8. Conclusion and discussion
We have studied the computational complexity of the credulous and sceptical reasoning
problems under the new admissibility and preferability semantics for the abstract
framework for default reasoning proposed in [1], for a number of concrete instances of
the abstract framework, namely theorist, circumscription, logic programming (LP), default
logic (DL) and autoepistemic logic (AEL). These new semantics are presented in [1]
as “simpler” alternatives to the conventional stability semantics for all instances of the
framework (see Section 1 for a discussion of this issue).
Table 2 summarises the results we have proven (for the admissibility and preferability
semantics) as well as existing results in the literature (for the stability semantics). In
the table, “X -c.” stands for “X -complete.” We have proven the results by appealing to
properties of the frameworks, whenever possible. In particular, we have used the properties
(proven in [1]) that default logic and logic programming are flat frameworks and that
theorist and circumscription are normal frameworks. In addition, we have introduced the
new property that frameworks are simple, and proven that theorist and circumscription
satisfy such property. Autoepistemic logic is a general framework in that it does not satisfy
any special property amongst the ones considered.
The table shows that reasoning under the new semantics can be much harder than
reasoning under the conventional stability semantics. In particular, for AEL, sceptical
reasoning under the admissibility and preferability semantics is one and two level harder,
respectively, than under the stability semantics, whereas credulous reasoning under both
new semantics is one level harder than under the stability semantics. Also, for DL and
LP, sceptical reasoning under the preferability semantics is one level harder than under
the stability semantics, whereas sceptical reasoning under the admissibility semantics is
one level simpler than under the stability semantics, but it reduces to monotonic reasoning
in the logic underlying the framework, thus becoming a trivial form of non-monotonic
reasoning.
There appears to be a clash between these results and the intuition spelled out in
Section 1, that admissibility and preferability arguments are seemingly easier to compute
than stable extensions. However, our results are not as surprising as they might at first
appear. Since the admissibility and preferability semantics do not restrict the number of
extensions, one would expect that default reasoning under these semantics is as hard as
under the stability semantics. The higher complexity of the sceptical reasoning problem
under the preferability semantics is due to the fact that in order to verify that an assumption
set is preferred, one needs to check that none of its supersets is admissible.
Of course, our results do not contradict the expectation that in practice constructing
admissible arguments is often easier than constructing stable extensions. For example,
given the propositional logic program P ∪ {p}, with P any set of clauses not defining
the atom p, the empty set for the query p that can be constructed “locally”, without
accessing P . Moreover, if P ∪ {p} is locally stratified or order-consistent [1], p is
guaranteed to be a credulous consequence of the program under the stability semantics.
Indeed, in all cases where the stability semantics coincides with the preferability semantics
(e.g., for stratified and order-consistent abstract frameworks) any sound (and complete)
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computational mechanism for the admissibility semantics is sound (and complete) for the
stability semantics.
The “locality” feature of the admissibility semantics renders it a feasible alternative
to the stability semantics in the first-order case, when the propositional version of the
given abstract framework is infinite. For example, given the (negation-free) logic program:
{q(f (X)); p(0)}, the empty set of assumptions is an admissible argument for the query
p(0) that can be constructed “locally”, even though the propositional version of the
corresponding abstract framework is infinite.
The complexity results in this paper show that sceptical reasoning under admissibility
and preferability semantics is trivial and highly complex, respectively. However, this does
not seem to matter for the envisioned applications of this semantics, because credulous
reasoning only is required for these applications [18]. For example, in argumentation
in practical reasoning in general and legal reasoning in particular, unilateral arguments
are put forwards and defended against all counterarguments, in a credulous manner.
Indeed, these domains appear to be particularly well suited for credulous reasoning under
the admissibility semantics. In general, the results presented in this paper indicate that
reasoning under the new semantics is harder. On the positive side, they indicate that the
new semantics allows us to encode more complex reasoning patterns than when reasoning
with the stability semantics.
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